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Abstract 
 
Along with the introduction of the long-term care insurance scheme, the Japanese government in 
2000 for the first time allowed for-profit operators to compete head-on with non-profit operators 
in the provision of at-home care services. This study examines quality differentials between the 
nonprofit and the for-profit sector in Japan’s elderly care industry, concentrating on home helpers 
and staff nurses. Taking advantage of a unique and rich micro-level survey, the study finds that 
although nonprofit operators provide higher quality of care, as measured by simple averages of 
workers’ characteristics, the advantage of nonprofits disappears once their higher wage is 
corrected for. This finding confirms that the seemingly higher quality of care provided by 
nonprofit operators is due to the nonprofit wage premium, resulting from their preferential status 
which provides non-distributional constraints and favorable tax treatment.   
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1.  Introduction 
In 2000, the Japanese government embarked on an ambitious program to reform the 
country’s health care system and introduced a long-term care insurance scheme.    Along with this 
reform, the market for the provision of at-home care for the elderly was deregulated.  Until  2000, 
at-home care for the elderly was provided under the state welfare program, with those qualifying 
being assigned to a nonprofit provider by local government officials.    Care services by for-profit 
providers were not reimbursed by the government, so that only the wealthy were able to afford 
them, and the market was correspondingly small (Shimizutani and Noguchi, 2004; Mitchell et al., 
2004).    Following the reform, however, patients are now allowed to choose freely between 
nonprofit and for-profit providers; services are subject to a 10% copayment of the cost, with the 
remainder covered by the long-term care health insurance, no matter what type of provider users 
choose.    Thus, for the first time, for-profit providers are able to compete directly with nonprofit 
providers in the home-help market.   
          The government based its policy reforms on the expectation that the entry of for-profits 
would contribute toward making the market more competitive.    With service contents heavily 
regulated and prices stipulated by the government, competition between providers necessarily 
concentrates on quality.    Despite the great social, economic, and political importance of Japan’s 
health care sector, to date surprisingly little research has been carried out on these reforms and 
their effects. In particular, little is known about quality differentials between nonprofit and for 
profit providers in this newly liberalized market.     
Unfortunately, researchers have not reached a consensus on how to measure the quality 
of care.    However, it is generally accepted that the quality of long-term care is closely related to 
the quality of workers.    The long-term care industry is very labor intensive in that labor inputs 
account for a large share, and capital inputs for a small share, of the factors of production.    Thus,  4
because of the difficulties involved in measuring the quality of output, we instead focus on labor 
input characteristics as proxies for the quality of care provided in different types of institutions.   
Proxies used in this study include workers’ age structure in an institution, the ratio of regular 
workers, workers’ skills (professional training inside or outside the facility), and the stability of 
the supply of services (measured by job stability and the demand for workers in a facility).    The 
study utilizes a large and unique employer-employee matched micro-level database to analyze 
sectoral quality differentials among home helpers and staff nurses, the two occupational groups 
accounting for the largest portion‐about 40% – of all employees in our dataset.     
Our findings show that although nonprofit operators provide higher quality of care, as 
measured by simple averages of workers’ characteristics, the advantage of nonprofits disappears 
once their higher wage is corrected for. This finding confirms that the seemingly higher quality of 
care provided by nonprofit providers results from the wage premiums that nonprofit providers 
can pay their workers due to advantages arising from their nonprofit status.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.    The next section briefly reviews 
the theoretical literature and previous research on earnings differentials.    Section 3 provides an 
outline of Japan’s long-term care insurance program.    Section 4 then describes the data used for 
our empirical analysis, while Section 5 presents the empirical results.    The last section 
concludes. 
 
2.  Previous research 
The type of question we are trying to address in this study is one that is very new in the 
case of Japan. Because service contents and prices in Japan’s long-term care industry are heavily 
regulated, providers must by default compete on quality.    Yet, there are few other industries in  5
Japan where nonprofit and for-profit operators compete.    The only studies we are aware of that 
try to examine quality differentials between the two types of providers therefore are Suzuki 
(2002) as well as our own (Noguchi and Shimizutani, 2005), which approaches the question from 
a different angle.    In contrast with the situation in Japan, there is a large body of literature on 
quality differentials between the nonprofit and for-profit sector in the United States.    One of the 
first to provide a theoretical explanation of the quality differentials observed between the two 
sectors was Hansmann (1980), who argued that the non-distributional constraints, i.e. the fact that 
nonprofit operators are prohibited from distributing net earnings, lead nonprofit providers to try 
to distinguish themselves through quality of service and refrain from opportunistic behavior. 
Opportunistic behavior, which may potentially arise in the for-profit sector, is possible because of 
information asymmetries between providers and consumers, preventing the latter from being able 
to observe the quality of service.   
    Another  explanation  of  quality  differentials  is that the different types of providers behave 
differently. While managers of nonprofits may derive greater utility from improving the quality of 
services as well as increasing profits, managers of for-profits are assumed to maximize profits 
only.    Newhouse (1970) argues that managers in the not-for-profit sector have fewer incentives 
to lower the quality of services provided since their performance is judged by quality or since 
they desire to show professional excellence or technical virtuosity by stressing quality. 
Many researchers have assessed quantitatively quality differentials between the two 
sectors. However, it seems fair to say that the empirical findings of studies for the U.S. are 
inconclusive.    While several find better quality of services in the nonprofit sector (Weisbrod 
(1988), Ullmann and Holtmann (1985), Cohen and Spector (1996), Holtmann and Idson (1993) 
and Gertler (1989)), Gertler (1992) arrives at the opposite  result.  The  overall inconclusiveness 
of these studies can be partly attributed to the lack of consensus on which variable is an  6
appropriate proxy to measure quality.    Some researchers use information disclosure to family, 
use of sedatives, happiness of family members (e.g., Weisbrod (1988)), while others use staff 
intensity (Cohen and Spector (1996)) or workers’ experience (Holtmann and Idson (1993)). 
Despite the academic and practical importance of this issue, little research on quality 
differentials in Japan is available.    The only related studies are those by Suzuki (2002) and 
Shimizutani and Suzuki (2002), which find that in the Japanese long-term care industry the 
quality of service provided by for-profits is not worse than that provided by nonprofits. Their 
analysis is based on a comparison of the total scores of indicators assigned to detailed 
characteristics of each facility and its employees. Another study is Noguchi and Shimizutani 
(2005), in which we use household-level data to examine consumers’ choice of providers and find 
that provider choice is not biased toward non-profits as assumed by Hansmann.   
The present study aims to examine the quality differentials between nonprofit and 
for-profit  operators.  Although  there  are  no  variables that allow us to measure the quality of 
services directly, it is widely accepted that in labor intensive sectors such as the long-term care 
industry, workers’ characteristics are closely related to their quality. In this study we therefore 
measure the quality of care by using the length of employees’ experience, their education, skills, 
and qualifications, as well as job stability as proxies.   
 
3.  The Japanese at-home care industry 
       Japan’s  market  for  elderly  care  underwent  fundamental  change  following  the 
introduction of the public long-term care insurance program in 2000 (see Shimizutani and 
Noguchi, 2004; Mitchell et al. 2004).    Before 2000, only lower-income households were eligible 
for elderly care services provided by local governments as part of the social welfare scheme.   
While the financial burden on users of such publicly provided services was negligible,  7
households were not able to choose between providers or service contents and had to accept 
whatever the government determined.    Private long-term care (LTC) providers were allowed to 
offer their services, but because users had to pay out of their own pockets, this was an option only 
for the wealthy and the market for privately provided care services was correspondingly small.   
        However,  given  the  rapid  aging  of  the  Japanese  population,  the  government  introduced 
a new public insurance scheme pursuing the following four objectives (Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare, 2002).    First, the approach seeks to mitigate the burden of home care for 
the elderly traditionally borne by women.    Second, the new system aims to make more 
transparent the relationship between benefits received and premiums paid.    Third, by integrating 
what had been a vertically-divided system of health, medical, and welfare services, the new 
program was designed to provide a means by which customers would receive comprehensive 
services from a variety of institutions of their choice.    Fourth, by separating long-term care from 
health insurance coverage, the new insurance program seeks to reduce the number of cases of 
“social hospitalization” where elderly patients are hospitalized simply because of a lack of viable 
alternatives, which pushes up medical costs (Mitchell et al., 2004).     
              Under the new insurance program, once certified by the local government to be eligible 
for long-term care, all insured persons are entitled to use care services.    The new scheme thus 
considerably widens the range and number of care receivers and explicitly intends to provide 
both in-home services (at-home care) as well as services at facilities (institutional care).
2   
                                                   
2  At-home care services include (1) home-visit/day services (home-visit long-term care, home-visit bathing, 
home-visit rehabilitation, day rehabilitation (day care), home-visit nursing care, day service, welfare devices 
leasing); (2) short-stay service/short-stay care; (3) in-home medical care management counselling; (4) care 
services for the elderly with dementia; (5) care services provided in for-profit private homes for the elderly; (6) 
allowances for the purchase of welfare devices; and (7) allowances for home renovation (handrails, removal of 
level differences, etc.).    Institutional care is provided in three types of nursing homes: (1) long-term care 
welfare facilities for the elderly (special nursing homes for the elderly); (2) long-term care health facilities for 
the elderly; and (3) long-term care medical facilities for the elderly. The last type also includes sanatorium-type 
wards as well as wards for elderly patients with dementia, and hospitals with enhanced long-term care service  8
The insured are free to use elderly care from any provider, subject to a 10% copayment of 
officially fixed prices specific to each type of care service.
3   
  Turning to financing, the Japanese public LTC system is a pay-as-you-go program.   
Half of the costs of this scheme are financed by the long-term care insurance contributions from 
the insured (aged 40 and over) and the remaining half is financed by general tax revenues.    At 
the same time, in order to meet rapidly increasing care needs, entry regulations were changed to 
create a more market-oriented system of provision.    That is, to stimulate the supply of elderly 
care services, for-profits were allowed to enter the at-home care market, though this is not the 
case for the institutional care market.    Under the public elderly-care program, care providers are 
not able to set their prices freely since uniform nationwide rates are stipulated for all covered 
LTC services; in addition, services are standardized.    Thus, the policy aims to introduce not 
price but quality competition in the market for at-home care (Shimizutani and Noguchi, 2004; 
Mitchell et al., 2004).     
 
4.  Data 
The empirical analysis of this study is based on the “Statistical Survey on Nursing Home 
Employees” (Jigyosho Ni Okeru Kaigo Rodo Jittai Chosa) conducted by the Care Worker 
Support Center Foundation (Kaigo Rodo Antei Center) in November 2000.    The establishments 
in the sample are randomly chosen from all areas of Japan.    The dataset provides information on 
various characteristics of both workers and facilities.    The notable merit of this survey is that it 
collects information on wages and other characteristics from all employees in each 
                                                                                                                                                                      
provision.  Medical  care  per se is not included in the LTC program but instead is offered under the national 
healthcare system (Mitchell et al., 2004). 
3  However, there is a limit to the amount of care that is covered by the insurance scheme.    Any care services 
beyond that limit, which depends on the care category to which a user is assigned by the government, must be  9
establishment.
4    It contains observations on a total of 39,261 employees with various 
qualifications, out of which we extract observations on employees with qualifications as a 
home-helper or staff nurse, for a total of 6,075 home-helpers (24.3% of the total) and 3,686 staff 
nurses (14.8%) of the total.    In the dataset, nursing care providers are divided into seven 
categories: for-profit providers, and six types of not-for-profit providers, i.e., social welfare 
corporations, medical corporations, authorized non-profit organizations (NPOs), Co-ops, 
agricultural cooperatives, and other charitable corporations.    Our observations are distributed as 
follows: of the 1,959 observations in the proprietary sector, 1,633 are home helpers, while 326 
are staff nurses; of the 7,802 observations in the nonprofit sector, 4442 are home helpers, while 
3,360 are staff nurses.   
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the characteristics of both types of employees and 
facilities.    The mean daily wage is approximately one percentage point higher in nonprofit than 
in proprietary facilities, though the difference is not statistically  significant.  Nonprofits  seem  to 
prefer workers aged between 40 and 49, while at for-profits, those aged 50 to 59 make up the 
largest group among home helpers and those aged 30 to 39 the largest group among staff nurses.     
Nonprofit facilities seem to prefer home helpers and staff nurses on a full-time basis.   
Consequently, the ratio of full-time regular home helpers is also higher in the not-for-profit sector, 
while proprietary operators favor part-time regular staff nurses.   
We also examine various facility characteristics.    First, we do not observe any notable 
difference between the for-profit and the not-for-profit sector in terms of the number of 
employees.    Second, most of the facilities respond that they are currently hiring home helpers 
and staff nurses and the retention rate is high.    However, for-profit operators currently hiring 
                                                                                                                                                                      
paid for by the user at full cost up to a “stop-loss” threshold called the “high-cost long-term care service limit.”   
4  However, if the number of employee was greater than 50, then the manager of the establishment randomly  10
workers report a higher turnover rate for full- and part-time home helpers and for part-time staff 
nurses; the only exception are full-time nurses.    We also have several variables measuring the 
non-wage benefits provided by different types of facilities.    For-profit providers more frequently 
offer work-related accident compensation insurance and health insurance than nonprofit facilities.   
If we compare the benefits full-time and part-time employees receive, full-time employees are 
more likely than part-timers to be offered work-related accident compensation and health 
insurance by both types of providers.    Finally, nonprofit providers offer benefits including 
professional training inside and outside the facility, additional pay on top of the basic salary, 
health examinations, subsidies for uniforms and equipment, and preventive care for work-related 
back pain and accidents. 
  
5.  Quality differentials between for-profit and nonprofit providers 
     This  section  examines  the  quality  differentials between nonprofit and for-profit providers. 
Our data set provides us with four measures of the quality of care provided by nursing homes: (1) 
workers’ age; (2) whether workers receive professional training (either inside or outside the 
facility); (3) the ratio of regular workers; and (4) job stability and the demand for workers in each 
facility.    Among these measures, (1) and (2) can be justified by human capital theory which tells 
us that experienced, better qualified workers are more productive. Since data on experience is not 
available, we use workers’ age as a proxy.    (3) and (4) try to measure both experience and the 
relationship between caregivers and care receivers.    Regular workers with a longer length of 
service at the same provider are better motivated and are likely to have greater on-the-job 
experience than workers who frequently change jobs.    Also, frequent changes of care workers 
are likely to make patients anxious and therefore less satisfied with the service provided. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
selected 50 employees for the survey.    11
          As already mentioned, 40 to 49-year-olds make up the largest age group among workers at 
nonprofit providers, while at for profit providers, 50 to 59-year-olds make up the largest share 
among home helpers and 30 to 39-year-olds the largest share among staff nurses.    We also find 
that nonprofit facilities tend to hire home helpers and staff nurses on a full-time (rather than a 
part-time) basis and the share of regular workers is larger at nonprofit than at for-profit facilities.   
Nonprofit providers are also more likely to provide professional training, both inside and outside 
the facility and, generally speaking, are not planning to hire additional home helpers or staff 
nurses. Thus, the overall pattern that emerges is that, compared to for-profit facilities, nonprofits 
tend to hire older workers and also tend to provide greater opportunities for workers to upgrade 
their skills.    Further, nonprofit facilities offer greater job security than  for-profit  facilities.  In 
sum, the basic statistics suggest that nonprofit facilities may provide better quality of care than 
for-profit facilities.   
       However,  we  should  keep  in  mind  that  quality  differences  measured  by  simple  averages 
cannot fully be explained simply by whether a provider is for-profit or nonprofit.    Put differently, 
the fact that nonprofits provide better services than for-profits does not prove that nonprofits are 
innately superior to for-profits. Rather, it is possible that the higher quality of care provided by 
nonprofits is the result of the higher wages they pay based on their nondistributional constraints.   
If for-profits were subject to the same nondistributional constraints, the quality of care might be 
the same for both types of providers.    Below, we will examine this possibility.   
As shown by Noguchi and Shimizutani (2005), there is a nonprofit wage premium in the 
Japanese elderly care market.    Thus, the difference observed above might simply reflect the 
difference in wages, not the innate characteristics of the two types of provider. In other words, 
workers’ choice is biased for nonprofits and we should correct for this selection bias when 
examining quality differences between nonprofit and for-profit operators.  12
In this section, we assess sectoral differences in the quality of service using the treatment 
effect approach (Barnow, Cain and Goldberger (1980).    This approach adjusts a nonrandom 
allocation of workers with respect to specific treatments.    We use two key variables as 
facility-based treatment indicators: whether or not a facility offers above-average wages, and 
whether or not a facility offers additional pay to workers’ basic salary.    Noguchi and 
Shimizutani (2002) provide evidence for the existence of a nonprofit wage premium in Japan’s 
long-term  care  market.  When  comparing  quality  differentials between nonprofits and for-profits, 
we should examine the possibility that wage differentials between the two types of providers 
affect the allocation of workers, which would then bring about the different patterns of simple 
averages described above. (In other words, it is possible that it wage differentials rather than the 
innate characteristics of the different types of providers that are responsible for the differences in 
quality.    The treatment effect approach enables us to examine quality differentials between 
nonprofits and for-profits after controlling for the selection bias caused by wage differentials.   
Concretely, we estimate the following two-stage model, where in the first stage we use a probit 
estimation and in the second a full maximum likelihood estimation.       
(1) First stage regression 
i 2 1
* l
i u Z + + = a D a X i i   l = 1,2  
1 Z
l
i =  if   0 ≥
* l
i Z  or  -  ui  ≤  η α i i D X +   
0 Z
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i =  if   0 <
* l
i Z  o r   -   u i  >  η α i i D X +  
where 
* l
i Z  refers  to  worker  i’s unobserved propensity to choose treatment l.    There are two 
treatments in this study. The first is the wage rate (l =1) and the second is additional pay on top of 
the basic salary (l =2).
l
i Z  is a dichotomous variable and takes 1 if a worker actually chooses the  13
treatment. Xi refers to characteristics of both employees and employers that might affect sector 
allocation.   i D   is a dummy variable for the proprietary status of the facility.    a1 and a2 are 
coefficients.  ui is the error term and assumed to follow  ) , 0 (
2
u N σ .  
(2) Second stage regression 
i b b b ε D Z X Y 3 i 2
l





where Yi is a measure of the quality of care. b1, b2 and b3 are coefficients and  i ε  is  the  error 
term, which is assumed to follow  ) , 0 (
2
u N σ  and  have  cov(ui , i ε )=  ρ . 
The total effect of for-profit providers on the quality of workers is calculated as the sum 
of b3 and the product of b2 and a2.    Table 2 reports the treatment effects of the wage rate and 
additional pay on various measures of workers’ quality.    After controlling for treatment effects, 
the estimated coefficients on the for-profit provider dummies are negative for age, the share of 
regular workers, the provision of training, and the demand for new workers.    These results 
imply that for-profit providers have younger workers, a greater proportion of non-regular workers, 
are less likely to provide training, and have a greater demand for new workers.    These results 
suggest that the quality of service provided by for-profits is inferior to that provided by nonprofits. 
However, none of the coefficients are statistically significant.    Thus, we cannot confirm that the 
quality of care provided by nonprofits is higher than that provided by for-profits.    These results 
suggest that the seemingly higher quality observed in the comparison of simple averages is 
brought about by the nonprofit sector wage premium and not by any innate characteristics of 
nonprofits.  
 
6. Conclusion    14
This study has focused on differences in the quality of care between for-profit and 
nonprofit nursing facilities.    Although nonprofit operators provide a higher quality of care as 
measured by simple averages of worker characteristics, the advantage of nonprofits disappears 
once their higher wage is corrected for. This finding confirms that the seemingly higher quality of 
care provided by nonprofit operators is due to the nonprofit wage premium resulting from their 
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Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard
deviation deviation deviation deviation
I. Dependent variables
natural log of daily wage 9.020 (0.305) 9.031 (0.269)  9.262 (0.311) 9.271 (0.285)
=1 if extra pay other than basic salary 0.653 (0.476) 0.766 (0.424)  a 0.653 (0.477) 0.810 (0.393) a
=1 if male 0.108 (0.310) 0.081 (0.273)  a 0.025 (0.155) 0.046 (0.209) b
Age structure
=1 if 20<=age<30  0.157 (0.364) 0.189 (0.391)  a 0.181 (0.386) 0.153 (0.360)
=1 if 30<=age<40 0.158 (0.365) 0.165 (0.372)  0.294 (0.457) 0.290 (0.454)
=1 if 40<=age<50 0.236 (0.425) 0.336 (0.472)  a 0.221 (0.415) 0.340 (0.474) a
=1 if 50<=age<60 0.256 (0.437) 0.244 (0.430)  0.166 (0.372) 0.154 (0.361)
=1 if 60<=age<70 0.116 (0.321) 0.025 (0.157)  a 0.058 (0.235) 0.033 (0.179) a
Workers' status
=1 if regular worker 0.617 (0.431) 0.839 (0.440)  a 0.733 (0.429) 0.923 (0.328)  a
                =1 if full-time 0.460 (0.499) 0.639 (0.480)  a 0.577 (0.495) 0.834 (0.372) a
                =1 if part-time 0.157 (0.364) 0.200 (0.400)  a 0.156 (0.364) 0.089 (0.284) a
Workers' skills
=1 if professional training inside/outside the organization 0.716 (0.451) 0.825 (0.380)  a 0.727 (0.446) 0.868 (0.338) a
Stable supply of services
=1 if no plan to hire regular workers  0.055 (0.227) 0.099 (0.299)  a 0.031 (0.173) 0.035 (0.185)
=1 if no plan to hire nonregular workers  0.026 (0.158) 0.042 (0.200)  a 0.012 (0.110) 0.021 (0.143)
II. Independent variables
=1 if total number of employees: <29 * 0.178 (0.383) 0.070 (0.254)  a 0.187 (0.391) 0.036 (0.186) a
=1 if total number of employees: 30-100 0.305 (0.461) 0.373 (0.484)  a 0.331 (0.471) 0.376 (0.485) c
=1 if total number of employees: 100-299 0.127 (0.333) 0.193 (0.395)  a 0.117 (0.321) 0.232 (0.422) a
=1 if total number of employees: 300-499 0.039 (0.194) 0.036 (0.185)  0.046 (0.210) 0.038 (0.191)
=1 if total number of employees: >=500 0.061 (0.240) 0.040 (0.195)  a 0.193 (0.395) 0.051 (0.219) a
=1 if provision of care planning   0.745 (0.436) 0.874 (0.331)  a 0.859 (0.349) 0.864 (0.343)
=1 if provision of home-visit care 0.931 (0.253) 0.762 (0.426)  a 0.819 (0.386) 0.521 (0.500) a
=1 if provision of home-visit bathing 0.192 (0.394) 0.241 (0.428)  a 0.423 (0.495) 0.144 (0.351) a
=1 if provision of home-visit nursing 0.110 (0.313) 0.135 (0.342)  a 0.236 (0.425) 0.295 (0.456) a
=1 if provision of day care 0.118 (0.323) 0.642 (0.480)  a 0.230 (0.422) 0.592 (0.491) a
=1 if provision of day care rehabilitation 0.000 (0.000) 0.122 (0.328)  a 0.009 (0.096) 0.377 (0.485) a
=1 if provision of short-term stay 0.026 (0.158) 0.463 (0.499)  a 0.080 (0.271) 0.495 (0.500) a
=1 if provision of guidance in care management at home 0.007 (0.082) 0.060 (0.237)  a 0.000 (0.000) 0.156 (0.363) a
=1 if provision of rental care equipment 0.233 (0.423) 0.094 (0.292)  a 0.344 (0.476) 0.053 (0.223) a
=1 if work-related accident compensation insurance for regular workers 0.814 (0.389) 0.637 (0.481)  a 0.733 (0.443) 0.498 (0.500) a
=1 if work-related accident compensation insurance for nonregular work 0.449 (0.498) 0.364 (0.481)  a 0.417 (0.494) 0.240 (0.427) a
=1 if health insurance for regular workers 0.734 (0.442) 0.626 (0.484)  a 0.730 (0.445) 0.497 (0.500) a
=1 if health insurance for nonregular  workers 0.051 (0.221) 0.070 (0.256)  a 0.077 (0.267) 0.055 (0.228) c
=1 if health examination 0.539 (0.499) 0.564 (0.496)  b 0.537 (0.499) 0.549 (0.498)
=1 if provision of or subsidy for uniform or care equipment 0.765 (0.424) 0.873 (0.333)  a 0.859 (0.349) 0.887 (0.317) c
=1 if policy for preventing work-related back pain 0.254 (0.435) 0.439 (0.496)  a 0.316 (0.466) 0.401 (0.490) a
=1 if policy for preventing work-related accidents 0.214 (0.410) 0.246 (0.431)  a 0.230 (0.422) 0.233 (0.423)
=1 if professional training for managers in human resource division 0.242 (0.428) 0.303 (0.460)  a 0.175 (0.380) 0.309 (0.462) a
=1 if support for stress at work  0.421 (0.494) 0.239 (0.427)  a 0.359 (0.480) 0.208 (0.406) a
Note: a-c indicate statistically significant differences between the for-profit and nonprofit sector means at the 5%, 10%, and 15% levels, respectively, 
Based on F-statistics of ANOVA.
(n=1,633) (n=4,442) (n=326) (n=3,360)
Table 1: Definition and summary statistics of key variables
Home Helpers Staff Nurses
For-profit Nonprofit For-profit Nonprofit 
Workers' status Workers' skills
Share of Share of Share of Share of Professional  Job security Job security
workers in  workers in  workers older  regular workers training for regular workers for nonregular workers
their 20s their 30s than 40 (inside or ʢno plan to ʢno plan to
outside) hire additional  hire additional 
workers) workers)
I. Home helpers
 Panel (1): Treatment (Daily wageʼaverage) Estimated a2 =-0.037(0.050)
 
For-profit dummy -0.002 -0.104 a -0.029 a -0.076 a -0.116 a -0.074 a -0.062 a
(b3) (-0.52) (-21.12) (-5.69) (-10.48) (-8.48) (-9.33) (-10.44)
Treatment -0.104 a 0.226 a 0.226 a 0.270 a 0.369 a -0.087 a 0.183 a
(b2) (-20.24) (61.97) (49.31) (38.70) (10.34) -(4.040) (19.470)
Total effect -0.104 0.200 0.220 0.254 0.365 -0.092 0.181
(b3+b2*a2) (-0.28) (0.55) (0.61) (0.69)  (0.97)  (-0.24) (0.49) 
Log likelihood 4760.459 3115.569 2461.131 -1303.834 -8717.089 -4012.635 -715.351
 Panel (2): Treatment (Additional pay to basic salary) Estimated a2 =-0.109(0.049)
 
For-profit dummy -0.001 -0.082 a -0.002 -0.056 a -0.121 a -0.092 a -0.070 a
(b3) (-0.36) (-18.39) (-0.42) (-7.94) (-9.39) (-11.00) ( -11.81)
Treatment 0.106 a 0.171 a 0.152 a 0.300 a 0.084 a -0.307 a -0.204 a
(b2) (20.33) (30.28) (23.84) (41.17) (2.46) (-21.21) (-26.35)
Total effect 0.106 0.176 0.152 0.301 0.119 -0.287 -0.192
(b3+b2*a2) (0.44) (0.74) (0.64) (1.20)  (0.50)  (-1.19) (-0.79)
Log likelihood 4,927.55 2,902.39 2,247.76 -1,387.07 -8,937.99 -4,032.97 -660.23
II. Staff nurses
 Panel (1): Treatment (Daily wageʼaverage) Estimated a2 = -0.289(0.109)
 
For-profit dummy 0.012 -0.019 a 0.012 0.039 a -0.141 a -0.049 a -0.015
(b3) (1.34) (-2.17) (-1.48) (2.94) (-5.69) (-3.49) (-1.45)
Treatment 0.162 a 0.179 a 0.125 a 0.228 a -0.013 0.088 a 0.068 a
(b2) (26.53) (-27.92) (16.81) (18.59) ( -1.04) (2.89) (5.08)
Total effect -0.035 -0.088 -0.035 -0.067 -0.135 -0.089 -0.046
(b3+b2*a2) (-0.21) (-0.52) (-0.21) (-0.39) (-0.77) (-0.51) (-0.26)
Log likelihood 2169.915 1965.094 2182.790 126.006 -3038.086 -403.753 877.138
 Panel (2): Treatment (Additional pay to basic salary) Estimated a2 = 0.073(0.112)
 
For-profit dummy -0.013 b -0.041 a 0.009 0.010 -0.152 a -0.055 a -0.028 a
(b3) (-1.91) (-4.67) (-1.07) (0.72) (-6.29) (-3.81) (-2.51)
Treatment -0.0147 -0.147 a -0.132 a 0.233 a 0.035 -0.235 a -0.175 a
(b2) (-0.94) (-18.43) (-16.86) (17.97) (0.73) (-29.4) (-29.11)
Total effect -0.015 -0.044 -0.003 0.066 -0.149 -0.089 -0.071
(b3+b2*a2) (-0.12) (-0.37) (-0.03) (0.53) (-0.85) (-0.78) (-0.60)
Log likelihood 2,504.09 2,155.22 2,438.45 233.02 -2,969.31 -86.14 1,060.57
Notes: 
(1) All  the regressions are adjusted for various individual and facility characteristics.  
(2) Parameter estimates are reported with t-statistics in parentheses.  a-c denote significances level of 5%, 10%, and 15%, respectively.
(3) No covariance (ρ) is statistically significant.  
Age structure
Table 2 ɿɹThe Effects of For-Profit Status on Quality of Workers
Stable supply of services